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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§78A-3-102(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the District Court correctly rule that the $tate of Utah failed to meet its 
obligations to plead its Utah False Claims Act and fraudulent misrepresentation claims 
with particularity, as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)? 
Standard of Review: The propriety of a motion to dismiss under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(b) is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Coroles v. Sabey, 
2003 UTApp 339,^1 15. 
II. Did the District Court correctly rule that the State of Utah was required 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to plead its claims arising under the Utah False 
Claims Act with particularity? 
Standard of Review: The propriety of a motion to dismiss under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(b) is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Coroles v. Sabey, 
2003 UTApp 339,^15. 
III. Did the District Court correctly dismiss the 3tate of Utah's claims for 
failure to state a claim pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)? 
Standard of Review: The dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Id. 
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IV. Did the District Court correctly rule that, even if sufficiently plead under 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6), the State of Utah's claims arising under 
the Utah False Claims Act prior to April 30, 2006, were barred as a matter of law? 
Standard of Review: The application of a statute of limitations is a question of 
law, reviewed for correctness. Davis v. Provo City Corp., 2008 UT 59, ^ | 9. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, AND RULES 
There are no provisions of the Utah State Constitution that are determinative in 
this appeal. 
The following statutes apply: Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-20-1 to 26-20-15 (effective 
Apr. 30, 2007) and Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-302 (formerly cited as § 78-12-29). 
The following rules apply: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
This case turns principally on whether the State is obligated, as any other litigant, 
to follow the law of the State of Utah, which requires that plaintiffs plead "all averments 
of fraud" with particularity pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) ("Rule 9(b)"). 
The State's Second Amended Complaint against defendants failed to meet the minimum 
requirements set forth in Rule 9(b), failed to state a claim under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"), and seeks redress for conduct prior to April 30, 
2006, which is beyond the statute of limitations. 
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B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below. 
On May 8, 2008, the State of Utah filed a Complaint against the defendants, 
sixteen manufacturers of prescription drugs, in Third District Court. The Complaint 
claimed the defendants had falsely represented certain pricing information, giving rise to 
fraudulent misrepresentation and Utah False Claims Act claims. The State filed an 
Amended Complaint on June 12, 2008. 
The defendants moved to dismiss the State's Amended Complaint because the 
State had failed to plead its claims with particularity under Rule 9(b) and had failed to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). The defendants 
also argued that the Amendments to the Utah False Claims Act made in 2007 ("2007 
Amendments"), which lengthened the Act's statute of limitations, did not apply 
retroactively to revive claims that had expired under the prior limitations period. Thus, 
the defendants argued that the State had improperly asserted claims arising before April 
30, 2006. 
On February 13, 2009, in a Memorandum Decision ("Memorandum Decision I"), 
the District Court granted the defendants' motion in part, ruling that the State was 
obligated to plead its claims with particularity under Rule 9(b), that its conclusory 
allegations were insufficient for purposes of Rule 9(b), an<} that the 2007 Amendments to 
the Utah False Claims Act did not apply retroactively to revive dead claims. Mem. 
Decision I (R. 1090-1102). Rather than dismissing the State's Amended Complaint with 
prejudice, the District Court granted the State leave to amend. The Court's decision 
#273992 vl sic 
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specifically instructed the State on the detail required to satisfy Rule 9(b)'s particularity 
requirement. Id. 
Rather than satisfy Rule 9(b) by repleading according to the District Court's 
directives, the State filed essentially the same complaint, with a few additional boilerplate 
allegations and a list of purported "drugs at issue" attached. See Second Amended 
Complaint, dated March 31, 2009 (R. 1117-1185). The defendants promptly moved to 
dismiss the State's Second Amended Complaint with prejudice. 
In response to the defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and after hearing oral argument 
at which the State admitted that the Second Amended Complaint constituted the State's 
"best" effort to comply with Rule 9(b) as articulated in Memorandum Decision I (R. 2167 
at 28:14-15), on February 26, 2010, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision 
granting defendants' various Motions to Dismiss ("Memorandum Decision IF') (R. 2080-
2095). 
On April 8, 2010, the District Court entered an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice 
of the State of Utah's Second Amended Complaint ("Order"), setting forth the Court's 
reasoning and conclusions with respect to defendants' motions. See Order (R. 2126-
2135). The State did not attach a copy of the Order to its Brief of Appellant ("Opening 
Brief). The Order is attached hereto as Addendum 1. 
The State filed its Notice of Appeal on March 23, 2010. 
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW 
A. The Utah Medicaid Program. 
Utah Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that provides medical services to 
low-income citizens. See Second Amended Complaint |^ 105 (R. 1135). As part of the 
program, the State elects to provide a pharmacy benefit, which the State administers 
subject to certain federal requirements. See id. As part of the pharmacy benefit, the State 
reimburses providers including pharmacists for prescription drugs dispensed to Medicaid 
recipients. See id. The State has broad discretion in determining the payment 
methodology and rate for reimbursing providers, but Utah is required by federal law to 
set payment rates at levels "sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services 
are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available 
to the general population in the geographic area." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A). 
Providers are not required to serve Medicaid patients, but may elect to do so. 
Federal law thus requires that the State, in setting reimbursement rates, balance the need 
to provide pharmacies with reimbursement sufficient to cause them to voluntarily fill 
prescriptions for Medicaid recipients with the need to achieve efficiency and economy. 
See id. As part of this balancing, states must reimburse providers for pharmaceuticals 
within aggregate limits set by the federal government, which limits include, in addition to 
a dispensing fee: (1) the Federal Upper Limit ("FUL") for a particular drug, which is a 
maximum amount established by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services; (2) the estimated acquisition cost of the drug, as determined by the State; or (3) 
#273992 vl sic 
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the provider's "usual and customary" charge to the general public for the drug. See 42 
C.F.R. § 447.512 (formerly 42 C.F.R. § 447.331). Additionally, a state may set its own 
"Maximum Allowable Cost" or "MAC" for a drug, which is the maximum amount the 
state will reimburse for that drug. 
Although the Second Amended Complaint does not explain how the State has 
chosen to reimburse for drugs, the State alludes to the use of two pricing benchmarks 
common in the pharmaceutical industry: Average Wholesale Price ("AWP") and 
Wholesale Acquisition Cost ("WAC"). AWP is a benchmark published in third-party 
price reporting compendia. AWP is not defined by statute or regulation, and instead 
derives its meaning from how it has been used and understood for years by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and payors such as the federal and state governments and 
private insurers. Neither the Second Amended Complaint nor the State's Opening Brief 
provide any particulars whatsoever to support the State's claim that AWP is "commonly 
understood as the average price charged by wholesalers to retailers for a drug." Opening 
Br. 6; see also Second Amended Complaint \ 107 (R. 1135). 
WAC is defined by federal law as "the manufacturer's list price for the drug or 
biological to wholesalers or direct purchasers in the United States, not including prompt 
pay or other discounts, rebates or reductions in price." 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3a(c)(6)(B) 
(emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(b)(3)(A)(iii)(II) (Medicaid statute 
incorporating WAC definition). This is contrary to the State's assertion that WAC is "the 
average price paid by wholesalers to the drug manufacturers themselves." Opening Br. 6; 
see also Second Amended Complaint [^ 107 (R. 1135). 
6 
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B. The State's Allegations Of Fraud. 
The State's allegations of fraud against the defendants in the Second Amended 
Complaint are as follows: 
• "Defendants"—the Second Amended Complaint fails to individualize the 
allegations for the sixteen different pharmaceutical manufacturers, see 
Second Amended Complaint 1f 118 (R. 1139); 
• "provided, or caused to be provided"—the Second Amended Complaint 
fails to specify whether any particular defendant provided directly, or 
caused to be provided the relevant pricing information, or how the 
provision was made, see id.; 
• "false and inflated AWP, WAC, and/or other pricing information"— 
the Second Amended Complaint fails to state which defendants provided 
which prices, and fails to identify the "other" unspecified "pricing 
information" to which it refers, see id.; 
• "for their drugs"—the Second Amended Complaint does not identify the 
drugs for which it alleges it overpaid with sufficient particularity to put the 
defendants, who collectively manufacture thousands of products, on notice 
of what drugs are at issue in the case, see id.\ 
• "to various nationally known drug industry reporting services"—the 
Second Amended Complaint does not reveal which reporting services each 
defendant allegedly provided (or caused to be provided) these unspecified 
prices, see id.; 
• "between 1991 and 2006"—the Second Amended Complaint identifies the 
same fifteen-year period for all publications of all prices for all drugs by all 
defendants, see id. fflf 12, 19, 27, 32, 39, 44, ^9, 54, 60, 68, 73, 80, 85, 90, 
95, 102 (R. 1120-1134). 
The State then alleged that it purchased the defendants' unspecified "pricing 
information" from First DataBank, one of the "various nationally known drug industry 
reporting services," and used that information in an unspecified way to reimburse 
7 
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unidentified pharmacists for unidentified drugs dispensed to Medicaid recipients. Second 
Amended Complaint If 119 (R. 1139-1140). Finally, the State alleges that the defendants' 
allegedly "false and inflated" prices caused the State to pay "grossly excessive amounts 
for the defendants' prescription drugs'"—to Utah pharmacists, not to the defendants. See 
Second Amended Complaint ffi[ 119, 125, 137 (R. 1139-1141, 1144). In fact, although 
the State's Opening Brief alleges that the defendants benefited from the State's 
overpayments to Utah pharmacists by increased market share, see Opening Br. 7-8, the 
Second Amended Complaint contains no such allegations. See Wright v. Univ. of Utah, 
876 P.2d 380, 384 (Utah App. 1994) (holding the proper focus for a sufficiency challenge 
"is not on whether one party was on notice of unsubstantiated allegations that go well 
beyond the pleadings, but on what can be reasonably inferred from the pleadings 
themselves"). Instead, the Second Amended Complaint alleges only that the defendants 
"derived benefits directly from the State, in that the State's Medicaid expenditures 
ultimately ended up in the pockets of the Defendants." Second Amended Complaint 
T| 128 (R. 1142). The Second Amended Complaint does not identify those "benefits," nor 
does it allege how those "benefits" inexplicably "ended up in the pockets of the 
Defendants." 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court correctly ruled that the State failed to satisfy the 
particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) in pleading claims for fraudulent 
misrepresentation and violation of the Utah False Claims Act. Rule 9(b) required the 
State to plead with specificity "the relevant surrounding facts," including the "who, what, 
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when, where, and how" surrounding the misrepresentations. Moreover, Rule 9(b) 
required the State to plead facts specific to each defendant. Even though the District 
Court provided specific direction to the State regarding the types of allegations that 
would meet Rule 9(b)5s particularity requirements, in its subsequent pleading the State 
failed even to make a good faith effort to plead particularized facts. The State's failure to 
set forth such particularity merited dismissal under Rule 9(b). 
II. The District Court correctly applied Rule 9(b) to the State's claim for 
violation of the Utah False Claims Act. Because Rule 9(b) applies to "all averments of 
fraud," and the State expressly grounded its Utah False Claims Act claim in fraud and 
misrepresentation, Rule 9(b) applies to its claims under the Act. 
III. The District Court correctly ruled that, even accepting the factual 
allegations in the complaint as true, and considering all reasonable inferences to be drawn 
from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the State failed to state a claim for 
fraudulent misrepresentation or for violation of the Utah False Claims Act. Among other 
things, the State failed to plead any defendant submitted or caused to be submitted a 
claim for payment to the State. The State likewise did not plead, and cannot plead, 
reasonable reliance sufficient to state a claim for fraud. 
IV. The District Court correctly ruled that, even if the State's claims were pled 
within the confines of Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6), the State's Utah False Claims Act claims 
are limited to conduct occurring after April 30, 2006. Even though the legislature 
lengthened the statute of limitations period associated wit!} the Utah False Claims Act, an 
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amended statute of limitations cannot be applied retroactively to revive a previously 
barred claim, but can only extend the life of a claim that was not already barred. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE STATE'S 
ALLEGATIONS FAILED TO SATISFY RULE 9(bVS PARTICULARITY 
REQUIREMENTS. 
A. The State Must Satisfy Rule 9(b)'s Particularity Requirements As 
Properly Articulated By The District Court. 
In its Opening Brief, the State concedes that its Second Amended Complaint failed 
to satisfy Rule 9(b) as applied by the District Court. Instead, the State ignores the Rule's 
clearly stated particularity requirement, and the many cases interpreting that requirement, 
and argues that Rule 9(b) requires only notice pleading. See Opening Br. 14-16. The 
State then argues that the Second Amended Complaint satisfied "Utah's liberal notice 
pleading rules" because, by virtue of the "multiple lawsuits across the country arising 
from Defendants' conduct," the defendants "know precisely what the State's allegations 
entail and have ample notice of the claims against them." Id. at 17. The State describes 
the defendants' efforts to hold the State accountable for satisfying Utah pleading 
standards as "exploiting] a legal technicality." Id. at 19. 
Rule 9(b) is not a "legal technicality." Pleading fraud claims with particularity 
protects a defendant's reputation from harm caused by "spurious charges of immoral and 
fraudulent behavior," minimizes strike suits and "fishing expeditions," and provides 
notice of the claim to the adverse party. See Vicom, Inc. v. liar bridge Merchant Servs., 
20 F.3d 771, 777 (7th Cir. 1994); see also United States ex rel. Snapp, Inc. v. Ford Motor 
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Co., 532 F.3d 496, 504 (6th Cir. 2008). In particular, Rule 9(b)'s requirement that a 
plaintiff give adequate and early notice of its fraud claims provides a defendant the 
opportunity to resolve "frivolous disputes by attacking the harrow basis of an allegation 
of fraud." United States ex rel Snapp, 532 F.3d at 496. That opportunity is particularly 
important here, where the trial court recognized that the State's inability to satisfy Utah 
pleading requirements may be due to the fact that there wak no fraud. See Mem. Decision 
II at 11 (R. 2090) (noting, "the State knew that published AWPs did not represent actual 
market averages"). See also Karacandv. Edwards, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1236 (D. Utah 
1999) (holding that "[t]he purpose of Rule 9(b) is to preverlt the filing of a complaint as a 
pretext for the discovery of unknown wrongs"). 
In cases involving multiple defendants like this one^ Rule 9(b) takes on even 
greater importance. Cook v. Zions First Natl Bank, 645 F. Supp. 423, 424 (D. Utah 
1986) (noting that the federal particularity requirement, which is identical to Utah's Rule 
9(b), "is especially important in cases involving multiple defendants"). It enables each 
defendant to be apprised of the alleged bad acts that the plaintiff attributes specifically to 
it, and allows the court to define the scope of an otherwise unmanageable action.1 
Moreover, Rule 9(b) plainly requires more than mefe notice pleading. By its very 
text, Rule 9(b) requires that, in a complaint alleging fraud, "the circumstance constituting 
1
 As an example of the problems of group pleading, i\ least one of the defendants, 
Qualitest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., now known as Propst Distribution, Inc., has not been 
sued anywhere else in the country in connection with such claims. As a result, even if 
other lawsuits were a proper consideration in evaluating the adequacy of the complaint, 
the State's position that, by virtue of the "multiple lawsuits across the country arising 
from Defendants' conduct," the defendants "know precisely what the State's allegations 
entail," is not factually accurate. 
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fraud or mistake [] be stated with particularity." Utah R. Civ. P.. 9(b). It requires that a 
plaintiff alleging fraud "identify exactly who made the alleged misrepresentations," and 
provide "the time and location" at which the alleged misrepresentations were made. 
Coroles, 2003 UT App 359, U 28. Further, it requires a plaintiff to directly connect each 
defendant to the alleged fraud by reciting facts showing that each defendant "personally 
ma[de] or directed] others to make" false representations. Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. 
Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ^18 see also Cook, 645 F. Supp. at 424. In short, it requires that a 
plaintiff identify the "who, what, when, where and how" of the alleged misrepresentation. 
Coroles, 2003 UT App 359, % 28 (citations and quotations omitted). 
The State cannot simply claim that the defendants "know precisely what the 
State's allegations entail" to avoid fulfilling its obligations to plead fraud with 
particularity. Opening Br. 17. As the District Court recognized, under Rule 9(b), "the 
State has the burden to articulate its fraud claims with specificity." Mem. Decision I at 4 
(R. 1093). Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has declined to relax the pleading requirements in 
Rule 9(b) on the basis of a defendant's alleged knowledge, given the risk that plaintiffs 
would then "base claims of fraud on speculation and conclusory allegations." See United 
States ex rel Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross BlueshieldofUtah, All F.3d 702, 728 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States ex rel Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp,, 
125 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1998)). Moreover, the State cannot seriously contend that the 
defendants "have a full understanding of the State's claims." Opening Br. 19. The 
identity of the specific drugs for which Utah Medicaid reimbursed, and for which the 
State believes it overpaid, is information that resides solely with the State. Likewise, the 
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methodology by which Utah Medicaid reimbursed and the ^mount of money the State 
believes it should have paid and why is known only to the State. 
In light of these principles and the nature of the State's allegations of fraud, the 
District Court correctly and properly articulated what the State had to plead to satisfy 
Rule 9(b). The allegedly fraudulent conduct underlying both of the State's claims is 
essentially the same, namely, that the defendants provided third-party data publishers 
with false drug prices that Utah Medicaid used to reimburse providers for drugs 
dispensed to Medicaid recipients, causing the State to overpay those providers. See 
Second Amended Complaint ^ 118-119 (R. 1139-1140). Thus, with respect to both its 
Utah False Claims Act and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, the District Court 
directed the State to: (1) identify the specific drug at issue; (2) identify the specific 
defendant involved in the drug's sale, manufacture, or pricing; (3) identify the allegedly 
false publication of that specific drug's pricing, to whom that publication was made and 
when; and (4) state whether the State actually used or relief on the allegedly false pricing 
information in setting reimbursement rates. See Mem. Decision I at 6 (R. 1095). 
Additionally, to the extent possible, the State was required to "identify the actual price 
that should have been published and identity of the party purchasing the drug." Id. 
Further, with respect to generic drugs, the District Court recognized that, while the 
State's initial complaint alleged AWP-based fraud, regulatibns require that generics be 
reimbursed based on benchmarks that are not dependent on AWP. See id. at 7 (R. 1096). 
Thus, the District Court directed the State to identify (1) "hpw the allegedly false 
publications of AWPs for generic drugs altered or influenced the unique standard of 
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reimbursement that applies to generic drugs," and (2) "which, if any, generic drugs were 
reimbursed at the AWP-based standard," and "why the State deviated from the general 
standard of reimbursement for generic drugs." Id. 
Finally, with respect to the State's claims under the Utah False Claims Act, the 
District Court instructed the State to "allege with specificity tha t . . . the defendants 
submitted claims to the State or directed others to submit claims," and to identify "what 
benefit the defendants derived directly from the State, rather than from the purchase of 
their drugs by physicians and pharmacies." Id. at 6-7 (R. 1095-96). 
The State's Second Amended Complaint wholly failed to satisfy any of the 
particularity requirements imposed by Rule 9(b) and articulated by the District Court. 
The District Court's dismissal should be affirmed. 
B. The State Failed To Plead Its Claims With Particularity. 
1. The State Failed To Identify The Allegedly False Publication Of 
Each Drug's Pricing, To Whom The Publication Was Made, And 
When. 
The District Court instructed the State that, in order to comply with Rule 9(b), it 
must identify "the allegedly false publication of [each] specific drug's pricing, to whom 
that publication was made, and when." Mem. Decision I at 6 (R. 1095). The State 
responded by adding three identical sentences for each defendant: 
[Defendant] made false publications for each drug identified in Exhibit A 
as follows: [Defendant] set, controlled and reported prices for said drugs to 
third-party compendia, including First DataBank. First DataBank, in turn, 
published prices for [Defendant] to the State of Utah. These publications 
became relevant each and every time Utah reimbursed a provider for a 
[Defendant] drug between 1991 and 2006. 
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See Second Amended Complaint ffi[ 12, 19, 27, 32, 39, 44, 49, 54, 60, 68, 73, 80, 85, 90, 
95, 102 (R. 1120-1134). 
The State's repetition of the same three conclusory sentences sixteen times—once 
for each defendant—falls far short of satisfying Rule 9(b). Indeed, the State failed to 
identify a single allegedly false publication of any drug. The State did not specify 
whether the allegedly inflated published prices for the drugs it identifies were AWPs, 
WACs, or some other price. Nor did the State identify to whom the allegedly false 
publications were made. The Second Amended Complaint merely repeats—sixteen 
times—the allegation that each defendant reported prices "to third-party compendia, 
including First DataBank." See Second Amended Complaint ffi[ 12, 19, 27, 32, 39, 44, 
49, 54, 60, 68, 73, 80, 85, 90, 95, 102 (R. 1120-1134). Similarly, the Second Amended 
Complaint failed to state when the allegedly fraudulent publications were made, and 
instead identified the same fifteen-year period for all publications of all prices for all 
drugs by all defendants. The State's sweeping, generalized allegation ignores the fact 
that virtually all of the defendants' products were launched, acquired, co-marketed, 
discontinued, divested, and/or sold during the fifteen years between 1991 and 2006. 
Additionally, some of the defendants' drugs lost patent protection, gained generic 
competition, or were subject to significant changes in pricing by manufacturers and 
reimbursement by the State during that time. 
By repeating, verbatim, the same conclusory allegation for each defendant, the 
State ignored the District Court's carefully articulated instructions setting out what was 
required in order to satisfy Rule 9(b). It also violated the principle that in cases involving 
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multiple defendants, "the plaintiff is required to set forth separately the acts complained 
of by each defendant." See Mem. Decision I at 3 (R. 1092); see also Armed Forces, 2003 
UT 14, ffif 16-18; Cook, 645 F. Supp. at 424. Simply stated, the State did not even 
attempt to satisfy Rule 9(b). 
2. The State Failed To State With Particularity That It Relied On The 
Allegedly False Pricing Information. 
In order to satisfy Rule 9(b), the District Court directed the State to allege 
"whether the State actually used or relied on the allegedly false pricing information 
which was reported in setting reimbursement rates." Mem. Decision I at 6 (R. 1095). 
The State responded by adding the same sweeping allegation as to each defendant: "The 
State actually relied upon this false pricing information each and every time it reimbursed 
a provider." Second Amended Complaint fflf 12, 19, 27, 32, 39, 44, 49, 54, 60, 68, 73, 80, 
85, 90, 95, 102 (R. 1120-1134). This boilerplate statement is plainly insufficient to meet 
the requirement that allegations of fraud be pled with particularity. See Armed Forces, 
2003 UT 14, % 16 ("[T]he mere recitation by a plaintiff of the elements of fraud in a 
complaint does not satisfy the particularity requirement."). 
Moreover, there are no allegations in the Second Amended Complaint that 
articulate how Utah Medicaid calculated reimbursement for drugs. The State merely 
recited the federal regulation regarding Medicaid reimbursement applicable to all state 
Medicaid programs and failed to state how Utah Medicaid exercised its considerable 
discretion under that regulation to reimburse for drugs. See Second Amended Complaint 
ffi[ 109-110 (R. 1136-1137). Although the State failed to allege how Utah Medicaid 
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reimbursed providers for the defendants' drugs, it did state that "[t]he Defendants' 
inflated AWPs were the only variable in the formulas used by the State to reimburse 
brand name drugs." Id. at TJ 115 (R. 1138). Likewise, the Skate suggested that 
reimbursement for generics was somehow "based upon AWP." Id. at f 116 (R. 1138-
1139). Yet the Second Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegation of what the State 
believes AWPs should have been, or why. The State alleged that "Utah Medicaid relied 
upon" not only AWP, but also "WAC, and/or other pricing information." Id. at ^ 119 (R. 
1139-1140). The State did not define "other pricing information" nor allege how WACs 
or "other pricing information" factored into the State's reimbursement decisions. 
Under Rule 9(b), the defendants are entitled to know what representations the 
State alleges were fraudulent and how those representation^ were used by the State. 
3. The State Failed To Identify The Drugs At Issue For Each 
Defendant. 
To satisfy Rule 9(b), the District Court instructed the State to identify the "specific 
drug[s] at issue" and the "specific defendant" involved in those drugs' manufacture, 
pricing, or sale. See Mem. Decision I at 6 (R. 1095). In an apparent attempt to satisfy 
this requirement, the State attached Exhibit A to the Second Amended Complaint, which 
purported to list the "drugs at issue in this case." (R. 1147-1185). That exhibit falls short 
of satisfying Rule 9(b). 
First, Exhibit A does not identify the drugs for which the State of Utah 
reimbursed. The central allegation underlying both of the State's claims is that 
"Defendants' fraudulent pricing and marketing of their prescriptions drugs" has "causfed] 
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Utah Medicaid to pay grossly excessive prices" for drugs. Second Amended Complaint 
Tj 1 (R. 1118). Accordingly, only the drugs for which Utah Medicaid reimbursed are 
relevant to this case, and, of those, only the drugs the State alleges were fraudulently 
priced are at issue. Nowhere in the Second Amended Complaint did the State even allege 
that the products listed in Exhibit A were ever reimbursed by the State. See Second 
Amended Complaint ffi| 11,18, 26, 31, 38, 43, 48, 53, 59, 67, 72, 79, 84, 89, 94, 101 (R. 
1120-1121,1123-1134) (alleging only that the defendants were "involved in the sale, 
manufacture and pricing information" for the products in Exhibit A). 
Second, Exhibit A does not put the defendants on notice of which drugs the State 
claims each defendant fraudulently priced. Rather, Exhibit A contains an alphabetical 
listing of virtually every product ever manufactured by any defendant—and many 
products that were not manufactured by the identified defendant. Exhibit A contains 
products referenced only by their chemical compounds, and attributes the same products 
to multiple defendants—"MORPHINE," for example, is attributed to six different 
defendants and "ACETAMINOPHEN" to eight different defendants. The State listed 
over-the-counter products like "ASPIRIN," "IBUPROFEN," and "TRIPLE 
ANTIBIOTIC OINTMENT," leaving the defendants to speculate how non-prescription 
products are relevant to this case. The State also included entries that identify only broad 
categories of drugs, like "ANTIBIOTIC" and "ANTACID," and broad medical 
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conditions, including "ARTHRITIS," "MATERNITY," and "PRENATAL." Several 
entries, including "TAO," "CHILDREN'S," and "RX EAR DRO" are unintelligible.2 
In fact, the State's targeted drug list is so deficient that it was impossible for the 
State to "identify the actual price that should have been published and identity of the 
party purchasing the drug" as requested by the District Court. Mem. Decision I at 6 (R. 
1095). Nonsensical entries such as "THYROID" are useless to allow even the State to 
determine whether it paid for a product, let alone to identify the provider whom the State 
allegedly reimbursed. 
Thus, instead of identifying the drugs at issue, the State appended to its Second 
Amended Complaint a list of purported "products" that may not have been reimbursed by 
the State, contained entries that are unintelligible, failed to put the defendants on notice of 
what drugs are at issue, and failed to give the District Court a meaningful way to define 
the scope of this action. 
Attaching a list of product names does not identify the drugs the State believes are 
at issue. A product's National Drug Code ("NDC") is needed in order for defendants to 
identify the specific products for which the State brings its claims. Pursuant to the Drug 
Listing Act, pharmaceutical drugs are commonly identified by NDC, a unique, three-
segment number, which is a universal product identifier for human drugs. See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360. For example, a drug such as acetaminophen, which is manufactured by several 
companies and has both prescription and non-prescription strengths and a variety of 
forms of dosage, would have numerous NDC codes. Each NDC code would identify 
which manufacturer, form, and dosage is truly at issue. This would enable the defendants 
to determine which of their products are at issue in this case and would give the 
defendants the ability to challenge the State's claims regarding certain NDCs, for 
example, if the State lists an over-the-counter product or a product produced by another 
manufacturer. 
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4. The State Failed To Satisfy Rule 9(b) With Respect To Generic 
Drugs. 
Recognizing that generic drugs are subject to a unique reimbursement 
methodology that is not tied to AWPs, the District Court ordered the State to identify: 
(1) how the allegedly false publication of AWPs for generic drugs altered this method, 
and (2) which generic drugs, if any, were reimbursed using an AWP-based method and 
why the State deviated from the general method of reimbursement. See Mem. Decision I 
at7(R. 1096). 
The State did not even attempt to comply with the District Court's guidelines. The 
Second Amended Complaint failed to explain the relationship between the allegedly false 
AWPs published for generic drugs and the pricing benchmarks that the State used to 
reimburse for generic drugs. The State alleged only that it reimbursed providers "the 
lowest of the acquisition cost as estimated through A WP9 the Federal Upper Limit if it 
existed for the drug in question, or the State's Maximum Allowable Cost if it existed for 
the drug." Second Amended Complaint f 116 (R. 1138-1139) (emphasis added). The 
State neither explained what "as estimated through AWP" means nor identified a single 
generic drug that was reimbursed at the AWP-based standard, as directed by the District 
Court. Moreover, the State failed to describe how AWP was used, if at all, in calculating 
reimbursement for generic drugs, much less explain why that method was used. Finally, 
the State's failure to identify the drugs it alleges are at issue makes it impossible to 
determine whether a FUL or MAC existed. 
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5. The State Failed To Plead Its Utah False Claims Act Claims With 
Particularity. 
The District Court recognized that "a fundamental element" of the State's claims 
under the Utah False Claims Act is "the submission of a claim for a medical benefit." 
Mem. Decision I at 6 (R. 1095). Thus, with respect to the $tate's Utah False Claims Act 
claims, the District Court directed the State to "allege with specificity tha t . . . the 
defendants submitted claims to the State or directed others to submit claims," and identify 
"what benefit the defendants derived directly from the State, rather than from the 
purchase of their drugs by physicians and pharmacies." M^m. Decision I at 6 (R. 1095); 
see also Sikkenga, Ml F.3d at 726-27 (holding that, with respect to the federal False 
Claims Act, Rule 9(b) requires the plaintiff to "set forth the time, place, and contents of 
the false representation, the identity of the party making the false statements and the 
consequences thereof). The Second Amended Complaint wholly failed to satisfy these 
requirements. 
First, the State failed to allege with particularity that the defendants either 
submitted, or directed others to submit, any claim to the State. The Second Amended 
Complaint does not contain a single allegation that any defendant communicated directly 
with the State, let alone submitted a claim to the State. Nor does it identify a single claim 
reimbursed by Utah Medicaid. The State alleged only that "[b]y injecting false prices 
into Utah's reimbursement process, the Defendants directed others to submit claims 
which led to false reimbursement." See Second Amended Complaint J^ 128 (R. 1142). 
The State did not identify the "others" whom the defendants allegedly directed to submit 
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false claims to the State. Nor did the State allege when or how that direction took place. 
Moreover, the State made this conclusory allegation as to all "the Defendants," thus 
making it impossible for any one defendant to ascertain what, exactly, the State alleges it 
did. 
Second, the State failed to identify "what benefit the defendants derived directly 
from the State, rather than from the purchase of their drugs by physicians and 
pharmacies." Mem. Decision I at 6 (R. 1095). The Second Amended Complaint 
included one sentence regarding the benefits the defendants received from the alleged 
fraud: "Each and every Defendant derived benefits directly from the State, in that the 
State's Medicaid expenditures ultimately ended up in the pockets of the Defendants." 
Second Amended Complaint ^ 128 (R. 1142). The State did not identify those "benefits" 
or allege how those "benefits" inexplicably "ended up in the pockets of the Defendants."3 
The State's failure is inexcusable. The Utah Medicaid program is designed and 
administered by the State. See supra, 5-6. The claims that the State alleges are false 
were submitted to the State. Id. The methodology by which the State chose to pay those 
The State's Opening Brief cites its Amended Complaint in support of its assertion 
that the defendants marketed the profit margin, or "spread," between providers' 
acquisition cost and reimbursement to increase the sales of the defendants' drugs. See 
Opening Br. 7-8. The District Court dismissed the State's Amended Complaint and, in 
Memorandum Decision I, instructed the State that to plead its "marketing the spread" 
allegations in conformance with Rule 9(b), the State must identify: (1) the specific 
defendant engaged in the practice; (2) specifics of how providers were induced to 
purchase the specific drug; and (3) the actual purchase price of the drug to the pharmacy 
and/or physician. See Mem. Decision I at 6 (R. 1095). Instead of following the District 
Court's instructions, the State abandoned its unsustainable "marketing the spread" 
allegations, leaving the Second Amended Complaint devoid of any allegations regarding 
how the defendants benefited from the alleged fraud. 
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claims was designed and implemented by the State. Id. The amounts that were allegedly 
"overpaid," and the identity of the recipients of those payments, is information that 
resides solely with the State. Id. Yet the State failed to allege those critical facts. 
6. The State Failed To Satisfy Rule 9(b) With Respect to Boehringer 
Ingelheim Corporation. 
For reasons beyond those stated above, the State's claims against Boehringer 
Ingelheim Corporation ("BIC") were further lacking the particularity required by Rule 
9(b). BIC separately moved to dismiss the claims asserted against it because the State did 
not allege that BIC manufactures, distributes, markets, sell$, or sets prices for any 
pharmaceutical product reimbursed by the Utah Medicaid program, and did not identify 
even one drug that BIC sold. The State's failure to allege these facts is not surprising 
given that BIC has never manufactured, marketed, or sold any prescription drugs. Tacitly 
acknowledging this fact, the State relied on conclusory, noh-specific allegations about 
BIC's subsidiaries — none of which is named as a defendant in this lawsuit — and failed 
to identify why BIC, which is largely a holding company, ip the defendant in this action. 
The District Court directed the State to replead to include tfie absent facts and gave the 
State specific directives to follow in any amended complaint: 
With respect to BIC, the State should focus on this company's separate 
corporate existence and identify only those drugs for which BIC, and not its 
corporate subsidiaries, is legally responsible. It appears that three of BIC's 
subsidiaries are mentioned in the Amended Complaint and may be 
responsible for certain of the "representative" drugs, but they are presently 
not named as defendants and have not been served. 
Mem. Decision I at 7 (R. 1096). 
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The State ignored the District Court's directives in the Second Amended 
Complaint. The State did not identify any drugs for which BIC is legally responsible 
(because it is impossible to do so), did not name any of BIC s subsidiaries as defendants, 
and did not add any allegations — let alone with specificity — to explain why BIC was a 
proper defendant. Instead, the Second Amended Complaint again lumps BIC together 
with several of its subsidiaries, and only lists drugs that are marketed and sold by BIC's 
two subsidiaries, Roxane Laboratories, Inc. and Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. 
Because the State did little more than cut-and-paste the insufficient allegations 
from the First Amended Complaint into the Second Amended Complaint, BIC again 
moved to dismiss. The District Court again granted BIC's motion and held that uthe 
State's Second Amended Complaint fails as a matter of law with respect to Defendant 
Boehringer Ingelheim Corporation because it does not adequately identify any drugs that 
BIC manufactures, sells, or for which it provides prices, or any BIC drug for which the 
State of Utah has provided reimbursement." BIC Order at 4 (R. 2103). 
The District Court's Order dismissing BIC with prejudice should be upheld. The 
State has failed to plead any of its claims against BIC with particularity and has otherwise 
failed to allege the most basic facts showing why BIC is a proper defendant in this case. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE STATE'S 
UTAH FALSE CLAIMS ACT CLAIMS MUST BE PLED WITH 
PARTICULARITY. 
Rule 9(b)'s plain text states that its particularity requirements apply to "all 
averments of fraud or mistake." Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) (emphasis added). Utah courts 
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have confirmed that the particularity requirements apply to a broad range of claims and 
"should not be understood as limited to allegations of comfrion-law fraud." Williams v. 
State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 1982). In Williams, this Court held: 
The purpose of [the Rule 9(b)] requirement dictates that it reach all 
circumstances where the pleader alleges the kind of misrepresentations, 
omissions, or other deceptions covered by the term 'fraud' in its broadest 
dimension. 
Id. (applying Rule 9(b) to a statutory claim). See also Corbies v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 
339, t 32 n.17; Jackson v. Phillip Morris Inc., 46 F. Supp. £d 1217, 1222 (D. Utah 1998) 
(holding that a claim under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act "arising out of 
allegations of deception, false misrepresentations and omissions[,] . . . must therefore 
comply with the specific pleading requirements under Rule 9(b) of both the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"). 
Here, the State expressly premises its Utah False Claims Act claims on averments 
of fraud: 
Defendants issued false and inflated AWP, WAC, and/or other pricing 
information for publication by the industry reporting services in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 26-20-3, 26-20-4 and 26-20-7. Because of 
Defendants' fraudulent conduct and misrepresentations, Utah Medicaid 
relied on the false information in reimbursing providers for Medicaid 
drugs. 
Second Amended Complaint ^ 125 (R. 1141) (emphasis added). The Second Amended 
Complaint leaves no doubt that the gravamen of the State's claim is fraudulent behavior. 
Having intentionally expressed its claim in terms of fraud, the State was obligated to 
comply with Rule 9(b). See Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b); Williams, 656 P.2d at 972; Coroles, 
2003 UT App. 339, U 32 n.17; Jackson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 1222. The District Court's 
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holding that Rule 9(b) applied to the State's Utah False Claims Act claims should be 
affirmed. 
Despite Rule 9(b)'s plain text and the myriad Utah cases that have both cited and 
applied the Rule, the State argues that the District Court's application of Rule 9(b) to its 
Utah False Claims Act claim is "unsupported by any Utah authority." Opening Br. 22. 
The State asserts that, because it "does not need to allege fraud to bring a claim under the 
Act," Rule 9(b) is inapplicable. Id. The State's argument ignores both the plain language 
of Rule 9(b) and the allegations in its own complaint. Rule 9(b) clearly states that its 
particularity requirements apply to "all averments of fraud," and the State grounded its 
Moreover, the District Court's application of Rule 9(b) to the State's Utah False 
Claims Act claim is precisely in line with other jurisdictions. The Tenth Circuit has 
concluded, repeatedly, that a plaintiff must plead its federal False Claims Act claims with 
particularity: "Rule 9(b) states that cin all averments of fraud or mistake, the 
circumstances constituting the fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.' Its 
heightened pleading requirements apply to actions under the FCA." Sikkenga v. Regence 
Bluecross Blueshield of Utah, All F.3d 702, 726-727 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal citation 
omitted); see also United States v. New Horizons, Inc., 348 Fed. Appx. 421, 424 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (holding that False Claims Act claims "which involve averments of fraud" are 
held to the higher pleading standards under Rule 9(b)); accord Karvelas v. Melrose-
Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 228 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding a party must state False 
Claims Act claims with particularity); Mitchell v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc , 248 Fed. 
Appx. 73, 74 (11th Cir. 2007) (rejecting False Claims Act claims that did not plead "facts 
as to time, place, and substance of the defendants' alleged fraud, specifically the details 
of the defendants' allegedly fraudulent acts, when they occurred, and who engaged in 
them."); United States v. Dizney, 295 Fed. Appx. 717, 721 (5th Cir. 2008) ("While 
complaints generally need contain only a short and plain statement of the cause of action, 
claims brought under the FCA must comply with [Rule 9(b)]."); Ebeidv. Lungwitz, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 16438, *4-5 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2010) (holding that even a claim for 
implied false certification to the government under the False Claims Act must meet Rule 
9(b)); City ofCudahy v. Sheppard, 2009 Cal. App. Lexis 1099, *30-31 (Cal. App. 2nd 
Dist. 2009) ("As with any action sounding in fraud, the allegations of a False Claims Act 
complaint must be pleaded with particularity"). 
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Utah False Claims Act claim entirely upon averments of fraud. See Second Amended 
Complaint ffi[ 124-132 (R. 1141-1143). The State also argues that, because it is 
"enforcing a remedial statute/' Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirements do not apply. The 
State points to no language in the Rule or in Utah case law excepting allegations of fraud 
made in remedial enforcement actions from the particularity requirement. In fact, the 
only authority the State cites is a single Delaware Chancery Court case brought under the 
Delaware Consumer Fraud Act and Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. State ex. 
rel Brady v, Publishing Clearing House, 787 A.2d 111 (Del. Ch. 2001).5 The State 
ignores considerably more analogous cases brought under #ie federal False Claims Act, 
to which the particularity requirements of federal Rule 9(b) are uniformly applied. See 
supra, n.4. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE STATE'S 
CLAIMS UNDER RULE 12(B)(6) FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM. 
The District Court correctly dismissed the State's Second Amended Complaint 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 
A. The State Failed To State A Claim For Fraudulent Misrepresentation. 
The elements that a party must allege "to bring a claim sounding in fraud" are: 
(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact (3) which was false and (4) which the representor either (a) 
knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such a representation, (5) for the purpose of 
5
 Importantly, the State did not cite to Publishing Clearing House below, and 
instead argued that "the State's claim under the Utah False Claims Act is not among the 
enumerated causes of action requiring greater particularity under Rule 9." See Order *§ 11 
(R. at 2\29)(quoting Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Secofid Amended Complaint at 
14). This argument has been abandoned on appeal. 
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inducing the other party to act upon it and (6) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and 
was thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and damage. 
Armed Forces, 2003 UT 14,1f 16 (quoting Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 
1060, 1066-67 (Utah 1996)). 
In granting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the District Court correctly noted that 
its previous analysis concerning the State's Rule 9(b) shortcomings applied to its Rule 
12(b)(6) analysis. Order at 9 (R. 2133). Because the Second Amended Complaint 
consisted of generalized conclusions, rather than facts, it failed to satisfy both Rule 9(b) 
and Rule 12(b)(6) and was properly dismissed. See Ellefsen v. Roberts, 526 P.2d 912, 
915 (Utah 1974) ("[T]he sufficiency of plaintiff s pleadings . . . must be determined by 
the facts pleaded rather than the conclusions stated."). 
Not only did the State fail to plead with particularity, it failed to allege 
fundamental elements of common law fraudulent misrepresentation. First, the State 
failed to plead reasonable reliance. The State never alleged that it acted reasonably and 
in ignorance of the alleged "falsity" of the pricing terms published by the third parties. 
See Armed Forces, 2003 UT 14, ^ [ 16 (an element of fraud is that plaintiff "act[ed] 
reasonably and in ignorance of [the representation's] falsity"); Bennet v. Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9 (dismissing claim of deceit where plaintiff failed to 
allege reasonable reliance). The Court need look no further than the State's Opening 
Brief for confirmation of this failure. The only allegation in the Second Amended 
Complaint that the State could point to regarding reasonable reliance was the conclusory 
statement, "[t]he State did rely upon Defendants' representations to the reporting 
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companies." Opening Br. 21; see Second Amended Complaint ^ 136 (R. 1143-1144). 
This allegation merely restates the required element and is woefully inadequate to 
overcome a sufficiency challenge. See Ellefsen, 526 P.2d at 915. 
Similarly, the State never alleged that it was induced to act upon any alleged 
fraudulent statement by any defendant. A necessary elemept of fraud is that the plaintiff 
was "induced to act" by the defendant's representation. Sep Armed Forces, 2003 UT 14, 
Tf 16. Again, as the State's Opening Brief highlights, the Second Amended Complaint 
alleged no facts regarding inducement, only a conclusion: frThe State was induced to act 
by Defendants' reports." Opening Br. 21; see Second Amended Complaint % 136 (R. 
1143.1144). 
Importantly, the State knew, as it publicly stated, th^t AWPs did not represent 
actual market averages. (R. 1642-1676). As the District Q)urt correctly noted, this 
admission and knowledge forecloses the State from pleading reasonable reliance or 
inducement. 
Because the State did not, and cannot, allege all of the necessary elements of 
fraudulent misrepresentation, the Second Amended Complaint was properly dismissed 
with prejudice and the District Court's dismissal should be affirmed. 
B. The State Failed To State A Claim Under The Utah False Claims Act. 
The State also failed to set forth all of the elements of its Utah False Claims Act 
claim. "Under the False Claims Act, a fundamental element is the submission of a claim 
for a medical benefit" Mem. Decision I at 6 (R. 1095)(emphasis added). As detailed 
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above, see supra, Argument Section LB.5, the State does not allege how any defendant 
submitted or caused to be submitted any claim for payment to the State. 
Further, the Second Amended Complaint failed to state "what benefit the 
defendants derived directly from the State, rather than from the purchase of their drugs by 
physicians and pharmacies." Id. The Second Amended Complaint alleges only that 
"[e]ach and every Defendant derived benefits directly from the State, in that the State's 
Medicaid expenditures ultimately ended up in the pockets of the Defendants." Second 
Amended Complaint ^ 128 (R. 1142). The State's failure to allege any benefit received 
by the defendants reflects not only a failure under Rule 9(b), but also demonstrates that 
the State did not plead, and will never be able to plead, a fimdamental element of its Utah 
False Claims Act claims. The State's theory is that the State overpaid pharmacists for 
prescription drugs because the defendants sold pharmaceuticals at a price lower than what 
Utah Medicaid reimbursed providers. By the very nature of the State's claims, the 
defendants did not "benefit" from the State's alleged overpayments because any alleged 
overpayment went to providers, not to the defendants. 
The State likewise failed to plead that any specific defendant's pricing information 
directly affected its reimbursement rates. As the District Court correctly noted: "While 
the Second Amended Complaint generally states that Utah Medicaid relied on certain 
pricing information, there are no specific allegations explaining the relationship between 
the individual defendants' allegedly false reporting of AWPs and the reimbursement 
formulas relevant to the drugs manufactured by that specific defendant." Order at 9 (R. 
2133). 
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The State's publicly stated knowledge that AWPs did not represent actual market 
averages precludes not only its fraudulent misrepresentation claim, but any claim under 
the False Claims Act, because the State cannot allege that the defendants knowingly 
made a false claim or that the State was deceived by published AWPs. As the State has 
not pled, and will not be able to plead, essential elements o^its Utah False Claims Act 
claims, those claims were properly dismissed with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) and the 
District Court's dismissal should be affirmed. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT UTAH FALSE 
CLAIMS ACT CLAIMS FOR CONDUCT OCCURRING PRIOR TO 
APRIL 30, 2006 WERE TIME BARRED. 
Even if the State's allegations were sufficiently pled under Rules 9(b) and 
12(b)(6), the State cannot assert a Utah False Claims Act claim for conduct that occurred 
prior to April 30, 2006. 
A. The Utah False Claims Act Amended Statrie Of Limitations Cannot 
Operate To Revive Dead Claims. 
The Second Amended Complaint states that the defendants' allegedly fraudulent 
conduct occurred between 1991 and 2006. See Second Amended Complaint ^ 12, 19, 
27, 32, 39, 44, 49, 54, 60, 68, 73, 80, 85, 90, 95, 102 (R. 11^0-1134). 
Prior to April 30, 2007, the limitations period applicable to violations of the Utah 
False Claims Act was Utah's general limitations period of one year for actions upon a 
statute for a forfeiture or penalty to the state. Utah Code Ahn. § 78B-2-302(3); see Utah 
Code Ann. § 26-20-9.5 (providing for penalties and treble damages to the state for 
violation of the False Claims Act); see also Castletons, Inc. v. Zions First Natl Bank, 
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990 F.2d 551 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding one-year limitations period set forth in § 78B-2-
302 (formerly cited as § 78-12-29) applied to statute imposing treble damages). The 
Utah legislature amended the Act, effective April 30, 2007 (the "2007 Amendments") 
and increased the statutory limitations period to six years after the violation, or three 
years after discovery, not to exceed ten years after the violation. Utah Code Ann. § 26-
20-15(1). 
Under Utah law, statutory changes to limitations periods cannot revive time-barred 
claims. In Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1062 (Utah 1995), this Court considered 
whether "a claim which was barred under the then-applicable statute of limitations [can] 
be revived by a subsequent extension of the limitation period." The Court held that an 
amended statute of limitations cannot be applied retroactively to revive a previously 
barred claim, but could only apply retroactively to extend the life of a claim that was not 
already barred. Id. "Since 1900," the Court explained, "this court has consistently 
maintained that the defense of an expired statute of limitations is a vested right." Id. 
Because the running of a statute of limitations creates a vested right, that right "cannot be 
taken away by legislation," even if the Legislature expressly provides otherwise. Id. 
"[0]nce a party acquired a defense based upon an expired statute of limitations, that 
defense could not be impaired or affected by subsequent legislation extending the 
limitation period." Id. Therefore, "when the statute has run on a cause of action, so that 
it is dead, it cannot be revived by any statutory extension.'" Id. at 1063 (quotation 
omitted); see also Del Monte Corp. v. Moore, 580 P.2d 224, 225 (Utah 1978) (holding 
that the legislature can increase the time to bring a claim that is not barred, but that a dead 
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claim cannot be revived by a statutory extension); accord Colosimo v. Roman Catholic 
Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2007 UT 25, % 29 (refusing to apply retroactively statute tolling 
limitations period in child sex abuse cases). 
Thus, the legislature's 2007 extension of the statute of limitations for claims under 
the Utah False Claims Act does not apply to any claim that was already time-barred as of 
April 30, 2007, the effective date of the amendments. Und^r the prior one-year statute of 
limitations, all claims which had accrued subsequent to April 30, 2006 were still alive at 
the time the 2007 Amendments became effective and thus Subject to the new, extended 
statute of limitations. All of the State's claims accrued on Or before April 30, 2006 had 
already expired when the State commenced this action, and| are time barred as a matter of 
law. 
B. The State's Arguments Are Waived, Or, Ii} The Alternative, Fail On 
The Merits. 
In its Opening Brief, the State raises two new issues regarding the application of 
the statute of limitations to its Utah False Claims Act claim$. First, the State argues that 
the District Court incorrectly applied the one-year limitations period in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-2-302, and should have instead applied the four-year catch-all period in § 78B-2-
307(3), or "perhaps" the six-year period under § 78B-2-30^(2). Opening Br. 28-29. 
Second, the State argues that the limitations period begins to run anew every time a false 
claim is submitted by a provider to the State. 
The State did not take issue below with the District (fowl's application of the one-
year statute of limitations for claims brought upon a statute for a penalty to the state. Nor 
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did the State raise the issue of "renewed" accrual of claims tied to submission for 
reimbursement by providers. As a general rule, if an issue is not raised below, it is 
waived on appeal. See Mule-Hide Prods. Co. v. White, 2002 UT App. 1, ^  13 n.5. 
"Exceptions to this general rule consist of those cases where there are exceptional 
circumstances for the failure to raise the issue below," or where plain error can be shown. 
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 78 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations and quotations omitted). 
The State makes neither showing, and thus has waived these issues. 
Moreover, even if the State had not waived these issues, its arguments would fail. 
First, the catch-all statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-307, applies to claims 
that do not otherwise have a statute of limitations. Here, the State's claims under the 
Utah False Claims Act, pursuant to which violators must "pay to the state a civil 
penalty," had a statute of limitations: "An action must be brought within one year . . . 
upon a statute . . . for a forfeiture or penalty to the state." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-
302(3). Thus, the catch-all statute of limitations does not apply. Furthermore, the State's 
argument that the defendants somehow breached a contract, therefore, the six-year statute 
of limitations for breaches of contract would apply, is facially ridiculous because the 
State does not bring a breach of contract claim in the Second Amended Complaint. 
Second, the State argues that, "|r]egardless of the applicable limitations period, it 
begins to run a new [sic] every time a false claim is submitted based on Defendants9 
inflated pricing." Opening Br. 30. The State cites no authority in support of this 
argument, and its own reasoning is illogical. The State asserts that a claim under the 
Utah False Claims Act "accrues and the statute begins to run when a pharmacy bills 
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Medicaid for payment." Id. The only conduct alleged on the part of the defendants, 
however, is that the defendants allegedly issued "false and inflated" prices to third-party 
data publishers. Second Amended Complaint ^ 118 (R. 1139). Therefore, the State's 
contention that each allegedly false claim submitted by a pharmacist constitutes a 
separate violation of the Utah False Claims Act by the defendants, for statute of 
limitations purposes or otherwise, fails. 
Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that the submission of a claim by a 
pharmacist constitutes a violation of the Act by the defendants, by the State's own 
reasoning, each submission of a false claim for reimbursement would start the statute of 
limitations running on that false claim. The State then concludes, without explanation, 
that "Defendants' liability for all of the False Claims Act's remedies and penalties is 
subject to a renewed statutory period with every false clairr) made." Id. (emphasis 
added). Putting aside the State's failure to allege that any 4efendant submitted a claim or 
received a benefit, the State offers no support or rationale f0r its conclusion that the 
submission of an entirely new false claim somehow revive^ the limitation period of a 
prior false claim. 
To the contrary, even if the allegedly false claims for reimbursement were 
actionable and could be attributed to the defendants, any cl^im submitted prior to April 
20, 2006 had expired under the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-2-302(3). Those claims could not be revived by the submission of a new, 
independent claim constituting a separate and distinct violation of the Act. Thus, the 
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District Court's order dismissing with prejudice all Utah False Claims Act claims alleged 
to have arisen prior to April 30, 2006 was correct, and should be upheld by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's order dismissing with prejudice the State's claims should be 
affirmed. To the extent this Court were inclined to reverse the District Court's order 
dismissing the State's Utah False Claims Act claims, the State should affirm the District 
Court's order dismissing with prejudice all such claims that arose prior to April 30, 2006, 
due to the limitations period then in effect. 
Dated this 21st day of September, 2010. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
APOTEX CORPORATION; BAXTER 
INTERNATIONAL, INC.; BOEHRINGER 
INGELHEIM CORPORATION; 
MALLINCKRODT INC.; CSL BEHRING; 
FOREST LABORATORIES, INC; MORTON 
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PLOUGH CORPORATION; SCHWARZ 
PHARMA USA HOLDINGS, INC; TARO 
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SMITH, INC.; and WYETH, INC. 
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On December 11, 2009, the Court heard oral argument on the Motions to Dismiss 
filed by the defendants in the above-captioned case. Having considered the arguments of 
counsel, the pleadings filed by the parties, and good cause appearing, the Court finds as 
follows: 
BACKGROUND 
1. The State of Utah's Complaint in this action, filed on May 8, 2008 and 
amended on June 11, 2008, alleged fraudulent misrepresentation and violations of the 
Utah False Claims Act against 17 pharmaceutical manufacturers. 
2. In a February 13, 2009 Memorandum Decision on the defendants' motions 
to dismiss the Amended Complaint, the Court determined that the "conclusory 
allegations" contained in the State's Amended Complaint "[fell] short of satisfying Rule 
9(b)." 
3. Further, with respect to the Utah False Claims Act, as amended on April 
30, 2007, the Court ruled that only the amendment extending the statute of limitations 
period, not the amendments affecting the mens rea or penalty section of the statute, was 
intended to be retroactive. 
4. This Court's February 13, 2009 Memorandum Decision granted the State 
leave to amend and provided the State specific guidance as to what it needed to plead in 
order to meet the minimum requirements of Rule 9(b). The Court instructed the State 
that its Second Amended Complaint must set forth separately and specifically the acts 
complained of for each defendant. Further, the Court instructed the State to identify: (1) 
"the specific drug at issue," (2) "the specific defendant involved," (3) "the allegedly false 
publication of that specific drug's pricing, to whom that publication was made and 
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when/' and (4) "whether the State actually used or relied on the allegedly false pricing 
information . . . in setting reimbursement rates." Finally, the Court ruled that, "[t]o the 
extent possible, the State should also identify the actual price that should have been 
published and identity of the party purchasing the drug." 
5. With respect to its claims under the Utah False Claims Act, the Court 
directed Plaintiff to "allege with specificity that. . . [the] defendants submitted claims to 
the State or directed others to submit claims," and to identify "what benefit the 
defendants derived directly from the State." 
6. The State filed its Second Amended Complaint on March 31, 2009. The 
Defendants timely filed Motions to Dismiss the Second Arhended Complaint on April 23, 
2009. 
I. THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILED TO SATISFY RULE 
9(b) 
7. The State's Second Amended Complaint did not comply with the Court's 
directions and failed to add the detail required to satisfy Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(b). To comply with Rule 9(b), the State must plead with specificity the relevant 
surrounding facts, such as the time, place and contents, of false misrepresentations, as 
well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentations. In other words, the 
State must identify the "who, what, when, where and how" of the alleged 
misrepresentation. See Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974, 981 (Utah App. 2003)(citations 
and quotations omitted). The State failed to meet these requirements. 
8. Furthermore, the Court previously ruled that because this case involves 
multiple defendants, the State is required to set forth separately the acts complained of by 
each defendant. See Armed Forces Ins. Exck v. Harrison, 70 P.3d 35, 40-41 (Utah 
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2003); see also Cook v. Zions First Nat 7 Bank, 645 F. Supp. 423, 424 (D. Utah 1986) 
(indicating that Rule 9(b) particularity requirements are "especially important in cases 
involving multiple defendants"). 
9. The State did not meet these requirements and again argues that there is 
nothing wrong with attributing conduct nonspecifically to "all defendants" in this context 
because all defendants had a uniform practice in reporting allegedly false prices. The 
Court reaffirms its prior ruling that "broadly-worded, blanket allegations of fraud . . . 
against the defendants as a collective will not suffice under Rule 9(b)." 
A. First Claim for Relief (Restitution, Costs and Civil Penalties under the 
Utah False Claims Act) 
10. In the February 13, 2009 Memorandum Decision, the Court found that the 
particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) apply to the State's claim under the False Claims 
Act. 
11. The State again argues that it is not required to plead this claim with 
particularity, because "the State's claim under the Utah False Claims Act is not among 
the enumerated causes of action requiring greater particularity under Rule 9." Opposition 
Memorandum at 14. 
12. The Court disagrees. The particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) are not 
limited to claims of common law fraud, but apply to "all averments of fraud or mistake." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b); Coroles, 79 P.3d at 981 (quoting Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 1982)) ("The Rule 9(b) requirement should not be understood as 
limited to allegations of common-law fraud... .It reaches all circumstances where the 
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pleader alleges the kind of misrepresentations, omissions, or other deceptions covered by 
the term 'fraud' in its broadest dimension.").1 
13. Courts in other jurisdictions have confirmed that the particularity 
requirements of Rule 9(b) apply to claims brought under similar statutes. For example, in 
evaluating a claim brought under the federal version of thq False Claims Act, the Tenth 
Circuit found that the particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) 
applied: 
Rule 9(b) states that 'in all averments of fraud or rfiistake, the 
circumstances constituting the fraud or mistake sh^ll be stated with 
particularity.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Its heightened pleading requirements 
apply to actions under the FCA. 
Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross BlueshieldofUtah, 472 F.3d 702, 726-727 (10th Cir. 
2006). 
14. Further, the two supplemental cases that the State relies on to argue for a 
lower pleading standard, United States v. McKesson Corp., No. 2:08CV214-SA-DAS, 
2009 WL 3176168 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 29, 2009), and United States ex rel Grubbs v. 
Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 2009), confirm that claims under the False Claims 
Act must meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). In McKesson, the court 
determined that the government had alleged sufficient detail concerning the alleged 
scheme to satisfy the Rule 9(b) requirements. The government had provided significant 
The State makes the following "averments of fraud" in support of its claim under the False Claims Act: 
Defendants issued false and inflated A WP, WAC, and/or other pricing information for 
publication by the industry reporting services in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 26-
20-3, 26-20-4 and 26-20-7. Because of Defendants* fraudulent conduct and 
misrepresentations, Utah Medicaid relied on the false information in reimbursing 
providers for Medicaid drugs. 
Second Amended Complaint at TJ 125 (emphasis added). 
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detail and specific examples of the defendant submitting false records. The detail found 
to be sufficient in McKesson is lacking in the Second Amended Complaint. 
15. During oral argument, the State's counsel indicated that Grubbs was the 
State's best case in support of its position that a plaintiff alleging the submission of false 
claims need not detail its allegations at the pleading stage and may instead provide the 
surrounding information later, at the "proof stage." In Grubbs, an action brought under 
the False Claims Act, a psychiatrist alleged that his employer and other doctors billed 
Medicare and Medicaid for services not performed. 
16. As in McKesson, Grubbs is distinguishable because the complaint 
contained "simple, concise and particular allegations" of fraud, including the particular 
workings of the scheme. The allegations included dates and times of meetings, attempts 
to assist the defendant in falsifying medical records, specific instances of unprovided 
services, etc. That level of detail and particularized allegations of a scheme are lacking in 
this case, rendering Grubbs and McKesson relevant only to highlight that Rule 9(b) 
applies to a complaint filed under the False Claims Act. See McKesson, 2009 WL 
3176168 at *6; Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190. 
17. The Court reaffirms its prior ruling that the State's claims under the False 
Claims Act must be pled with particularity. 
18. Finally, the Court rules that the State has failed to satisfy the particularity 
requirements of Rule 9(b) with respect to its claims under the False Claims Act. The 
State has again failed to allege specific facts indicating that the defendants communicated 
directly with the State, let alone submitted a claim to the State. Yet, the actual 
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submission of a claim is an essential element to any complaint seeking relief under 
Utah's False Claims Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 26-20-7. 
19. While the Second Amended Complaint vaguely alludes to the defendants 
directing others to submit false claims, the State does not identify these other individuals 
and their role in the submission of the allegedly false clainfis. 
20. Equally significant is the lack of allegations concerning the benefit which 
the defendants derived directly from the State. The State merely concludes that a benefit 
must have been derived and "ultimately ended up in the ppckets of the defendants." 
21. After two attempts, the State has failed to p)ead its False Claims Act 
claims with particularity. Therefore, the First Claim for Relief (Restitution, Costs and 
Civil Penalties under the Utah False Claims Act) is dismissed with prejudice. 
B. The Second Claim for Relief (Common Law Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation) 
22. To satisfy Rule 9(b), the State was required to plead each of the following 
elements with particularity: 
(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a 
presently existing material fact (3) which was false and 
(4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that there wa^ insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such a representation, 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it 
and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and 
was thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and 
damage. 
Armed Forces Ins. Exch., 70 P.3d at 40 (quoting Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 
915 P.2d 1060, 1066-67 (Utah 1996)). 
23. The State maintains that its Second Amended Complaint 'Vastly exceeds" 
the pleading requirements for the elements of fraud. The State again takes the position 
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that "[t]he Defendants know exactly what is at issue." This precise argument was 
previously rejected by the Court and its February 13, 2009 Memorandum Decision 
specifically indicated that each of the defendants was entitled to know what it allegedly 
did wrong. 
24. Once again, the State failed to identify each defendant's allegedly 
fraudulent misrepresentations with particularity; thereby affording the defendants no 
particularized notice of the allegations against them individually. Indeed, the Second 
Amended Complaint merely offers broad conjecture with respect to statements and/or 
claims that were allegedly false or fraudulent and that were made by the defendants as a 
group. 
25. Specifically, the State failed to identify the allegedly false publication of 
each specific drug's pricing, to whom that publication was made, and when. The Second 
Amended Complaint merely identifies the same fifteen-year period for all publications of 
all prices for all drugs by all defendants. 
26. Further, the State failed to allege with particularity the State's reliance on 
the alleged misrepresentations, and the consequences thereof. 
27. The Court is of the opinion that to find that Second Amended Complaint 
satisfies Rule 9(b) would render the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) meaningless. 
28. The State argues that it has now listed the specific drugs at issue in Exhibit 
A to its Second Amended Complaint. However, this list also contains drugs that the 
defendants did not manufacture and products that are referenced only by their chemical 
compounds. Exhibit A also identifies non-prescription drugs and broad categories of 
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drugs such as "antibiotic" and "antacid." It also references medical conditions such as 
"arthritis" and "prenatal." 
29. The Court agrees with the defendants that this list is not helpful and falls 
far short of the applicable pleading requirements. Indeed, the State is required to identify 
the specific drug at issue for each defendant, the actual prices that should have been 
published, and the identity of the purchaser. Exhibit A does not provide this information. 
Thus, Exhibit A is far too general to satisfy Rule 9(b). 
II. THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILED TO SATISFY RULE 
12(b)(6) 
30. The Court also rules that the State's Second Amended Complaint is 
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). In this regard, tht Court's previous analysis 
concerning the shortcomings of the Second Amended Complaint with respect to Rule 
9(b) pleading standards apply equally to its analysis under (Rule 12(b)(6). 
31. Specifically, not only has the State failed to plead with particularity, but it 
has also failed to allege fundamental elements of common law fraudulent 
misrepresentation and for relief under the Utah False Claims Act. 
32. Most notable is the State's failure to plead that the pricing information 
supplied by the individual defendants, as opposed to the defendants in general, directly 
affected its reimbursement rates. While the Second Amended Complaint generally states 
that Utah Medicaid relied on certain pricing information, thjere are no specific allegations 
explaining the relationship between the individual defendants' allegedly false reporting of 
AWPs and the reimbursement formulas relevant to the drugs manufactured by that 
specific defendant. 
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33. Indeed, the State has simply not pled how the individual defendant's 
actions led the State to set its reimbursement rates or how it acted in reasonable reliance 
on the pricing information. 
34. The State's failure to plead reasonable reliance may be due to its publicly 
stated knowledge that AWPs did not represent actual market averages. This knowledge 
not only forecloses the State from stating a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, but 
also prohibits it from fulfilling two required elements of the False Claims Act: that these 
defendants knowingly made a false claim and that the State was deceived by published 
AWPs. 
35. Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint fails to allege fundamental 
elements of its fraudulent misrepresentation and Utah False Claims Act Claims. 
Therefore, the State fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and both 
claims are dismissed with prejudice. 
III. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
36. Prior to April 30, 2007, the statute of limitations under the Utah False 
Claims Act was one year. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(3) ("An action may be brought 
within one year: . . . (3) upon a statute, . . ., for a forfeiture or penalty to the state."). 
37. The Act was amended, effective April 30, 2007, to increase the statutory 
limitations period to six years after the violation, or three years after discovery, not to 
exceed ten years, to be applied retroactively. Utah Code Ann. § 26-20-15 (2009). 
38. Only the amendment extending the statute of limitations period was 
intended to be retroactive. 
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39. The retroactive application of the amended statute of limitations provision 
cannot operate to revive claims that were already time-barred under the prior version of 
the statute. See Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1062 (ytah 1995) ("Since 1900, the 
court has consistently maintained that the defense of an expired statute of limitations is a 
vested right.. . .[W]hen 'the statute has run on a cause of action, so that it is dead, it 
cannot be revived by any statutory extension."). 
40. Accordingly, the amendments to the statute of limitations set forth in the 
False Claims Act could not, as a matter of law, revive expired claims for conduct alleged 
to have occurred on or before April 30, 2006. 
41. Accordingly, as an alternative grounds for dismissal, the Court dismisses 
with prejudice all False Claims Act claims alleged to have arisen prior to April 30, 2006. 
ORDER 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court rules: 
1. The Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice; 
2. The State's First Claim for Relief (Restitution, Costs, and Civil Penalties 
under the Utah False Claims Act) is dismissed with prejudice for failure to plead the 
averments of fraud with particularity as required by Utah Rple of Civil Procedure 9(b); 
3. The State's Second Claim for Relief (Commbn Law Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation) is dismissed with prejudice for failure tq plead the elements of fraud 
with particularity as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b); 
4. The State's First Claim for Relief (Restitution, Costs, and Civil Penalties 
under the Utah False Claims Act) is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); 
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5. The State's Second Claim for Relief (Common Law Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation) is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); 
6. With respect to the Utah False Claims Act, as amended on April 30, 2007, 
only the amendment extending the statute of limitations period, not the amendments 
affecting the mens rea or penalty section of the statute, was intended to be retroactive. 
7. All False Claims Act claims arising before April 30, 2006 are dismissed 
with prejudice. 
Dated this day of March, 2010. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT: 
Approved as to Form: 
yfr/Mjd 
STEELE & BIGGS, LLC 
By: 
Joseph W. Steele 
Kenneth D. Lougee 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
5664 South Green Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
David R. Stallard 
Assistant Attorney General 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Utah Medicaid Fraud Control Unit 
5272 College Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
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W. Daniel "Dee" Miles, III 
Special Assistant Attorneys General 
BEASLEY, ALLEN, CROW, METHVIN, PORTIS & MILES, P.C. 
272 Commerce Street, P.O. Box 4160 
Montgomery, AL 36103 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on th i§^? day of March, 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing [PROPOSED] ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE OF THE STATE OF UTAH'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
was served via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following counsel of record: 
W. Daniel "Dee" Miles, III 
Roman A. Shaul 
Timothy Robert Fiedler 
Special Assistant Attorneys General 
BEASLEY, ALLEN, CROW, METHVIN, 
PORT1S & MILES, P.C. 
272 Commerce Street, P.O. Box 4160 
Montgomery, AL 36103-416 
clint.carter@beasleyallen.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Robert E. Steed 
Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
Utah Medicaid Fraud Control Unit 
5272 College Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
dstallard@@utah.gov 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Merle M. DeLancey, Jr. 
Jason D. Wallach 
DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO LLP 
1825 Eye Street, NW 
Washington DC 20006-543 
delanceym@dicksteinshapiro.com 
wallachi@dicksteinshapiro.com 
Attorneys for Baxter International Inc. 
Julie Edwards 
Howrey LLP 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
edwardsjulie@howrey.com 
Attorneys for Boehringer Ingelheim 
Joseph W. Steele 
Kenneth D. Lougee 
David C. Biggs 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
STEELE & BIGGS, LLC 
5664 South Green Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
jwsteele5@att.net 
ken@sjatty.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Brian P. Miller 
Derek J. Williams 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
bpm@scmlaw.com 
djw@scmlaw.com 
Attorneys for Apotex Corporation 
Phillip S. Ferguson 
Geoffrey C. Haslam 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, PC 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Phillip.ferguson@chrisien.com 
Geoffrey.haslam@chrisien.com 
Attorneys for Baxter International Inc. 
Jonathan T. Rees 
HOGAN & HARTSON LLP 
555 Thirteenth Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20004 
j trees@hhlaw. com 
Attorneys for CSL Be firing 
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Corporation 
Peter W. Billing 
Timothy K. Clark 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C. 
215 South State Street, Suite 1200 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
pbillings@fabianlaw.com 
tclark@fabianlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant CSL Be firing 
Peter J. Venaglia 
Cynthia L. Ebbs 
Martin Barna 
Bruce Handler 
DORNBUSH SCHAFFER STRONGIN & 
VENAGLIA, LLP 
747 Third Avenue 
New York, New York 10017 
venaglia@dssvlaw.com 
ebbs@dissvlaw.com 
barna@dssvlaw.com 
handler@dss vlaw. com 
Attorneys for Defendant Forest 
Laboratories, Inc. 
Richard A. Vazquez 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P O Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
rv@scmlaw.com 
Attorneys for Mallinckrodt Inc. and Taro 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. 
Ryan M. Harris 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
rharris@joneswaldo.com 
Attorneys for Defendant Forest Laboratories, Inc. 
James P. Ellison 
HYMAN, PHELPS & MCNAMARA 
700 Thirteenth Street, N.W. 
Suite 1200 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
JEllison@hpm.com 
Attorneys for Mallinckrodt Inc. and Taro 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. 
Frederick R. Ball 
David I. Curkovic 
DUANE MORRIS LLP 
190 South LaSalle Street, Suite 3700 
Chicago, IL 60603 
frball@duanemorris.com 
dicurkovic@duanemorris.com 
Attorneys for Morton Grove Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
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Matthew A. Steward 
Robert D. Andreasen 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City UT 84111-2216 
mas@clydesnow.com 
rda@clydesnow.com 
Attorneys for Morton Grove 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
Andrew Berdon 
Jonathan E. Pickhardt 
Faith E. Gay 
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART 
OLIVER & HEDGES, LLP 
51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor 
New York, NY 10010 
andrewberdon@quinnemanuel .com 
jonpickhardt@quinnemanuel.com 
faithgay@quinnemanuel.com 
Attorneys for Mutual Pharamactucial 
Company, Inc. 
Bryon J. Benevento 
SNELL & WILMER LLP 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
bbenevento@swlaw.com 
Attorneys for Novartis Pharmaceuticals 
Corp 
John P. Harrington 
Cecilia M. Romero 
J. Simon Cantarero 
HOLLAND & HART 
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
iharrington@hollandhart.com 
cmromero@hollandhart.com 
iscantarero@hollandhart.com 
Attorneys for Mutual Pharmaceutical Company, 
Inc. 
Jane W. Parver 
Saul P. Morgenstern 
Mark Godler 
Sam Lonergan 
KAY SCHOLER LLP 
425 Park Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
jparaver@kayescholer.com 
smorgenstern@kayescholer.com 
mgodler@kayescholer.com 
slonergan@kayescholer.com 
Attorneys for Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp 
Matthew Campbell 
WINSTON & STRAWN, LLP 
1700 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006-3817 
macampbe@winston.com 
Attorneys for Otsuka America, Inc. 
#267039 vl sic 
16 
Amy F. Sorenson 
SNELL & WILMER LLP 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City UT 84101-1004 
asorenson@swlawxom 
Attorneys for Qualitest 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
John P. Bucjke 
Eric P. Christofferson 
Janna J. Hansen 
Brien T. O'Connor 
ROPES & 6RAY LLP 
One International Place 
Boston, MA 02110 
john.bueker@ropesgray.com 
eric.christofferson@ropesgray.com 
janna.hansen@ropesgray.com 
brien.o'connor@ropesgray.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Merck & Co., Inc.,fka 
Schering-Plough Corporation and Warrick 
Pharmaceuticals Corporation 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
Heather ML Sneddon 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
tkarrenberg@akl awfirm. com 
hsneddon@aklawfirm.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Merck & Co., 
Inc.,fka Schering-Plough Corporation, 
Warrick Pharmaceuticals Corporation, 
and Schwarz Pharma USA Holdings, Inc. 
Camille N. Johnson 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P O Box 45000 
Salt Lake Cjty UT 84145 
cnj@scmlaw.com 
Attorneys for Wyeth, Inc. 
M. Hamilton Whitman, Jr. 
Stephen Craig Holden 
Kelly J. Davidson 
120 East Baltimore Street 
Baltimore, MD 21202 
mhwhitman@ober.com 
scholden@ober.com 
kjdavidson@ober.com 
Attorney for Wyeth, Inc. 
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